The Burden of Proof in International Commercial Arbitration: Are We Allowed to Adjust the Scales by Blavi, Francisco & Vial, Gonzalo
Hastings International and Comparative Law Review
Volume 39
Number 1 Winter 2016 Article 2
1-1-2016
The Burden of Proof in International Commercial
Arbitration: Are We Allowed to Adjust the Scales
Francisco Blavi
Gonzalo Vial
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/
hastings_international_comparative_law_review
Part of the Comparative and Foreign Law Commons, and the International Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Hastings International and Comparative Law Review by an authorized editor of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. For more information, please
contact wangangela@uchastings.edu.
Recommended Citation
Francisco Blavi and Gonzalo Vial, The Burden of Proof in International Commercial Arbitration: Are We Allowed to Adjust the Scales, 39
Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. 41 (2016).
Available at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_international_comparative_law_review/vol39/iss1/2
The Burden of Proof in International
Commercial Arbitration: Are We
Allowed to Adjust the Scales?
BY FRANCISCO BLAVI AND GONZALO VIAL**
Abstract
This work discusses the ability of parties and arbitral tribunals
involved in international commercial arbitration to change the burden
of proof rules, concluding that the parties are entitled to alter the
referred rules subject to some limitations, such as the principle of fair
and equal treatment, mandatory rules, and considerations of public
policy and good faith. In addition, we observed that even though
arbitrators have broad powers to determine the burden of proof, they
are generally obliged to respect the agreements reached between the
parties consistent with that burden.
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I. Introduction
International commercial arbitration has been adopted around
the globe as an efficient method to solve commercial disputes,
promoting the participation of parties from different jurisdictions and
legal systems. The dissimilar backgrounds of the parties have often
resulted in gaps or unfamiliarity with the parties' rights and duties
during the arbitration proceeding; including those related o the rules
for the taking of evidence.1
There is no doubt as to the importance that each party prove the
facts specified in a claim or defense in the context of an international
commercial arbitration. Some authors have assessed that between
sixty and seventy percent of disputes are decided upon the facts of
the case, rather than on issues of law. Whether that percentage is
accurate or not, the huge relevance of determining the facts in any
international arbitration procedure is something we can all agree
upon.2 Evidentiary issues are "as important in international
arbitration as they are in litigation." 3
The concept of burden of proof plays a key role in the
1. FRANS H. WINARTA, Discovery of Documentary Evidence in International
Commercial Arbitration (Sept. 6, 2015), http://www.legal500.com/assets/images/stories/
firmdevs/frans_ paper.pdf (last visited Nov. 13, 2015).
2. Vit Makarius, The Nature of the Burden and Standard of Proof in International
Commercial Arbitration, CZECH & CENTRAL EuR. Y.B. OF ARB. 54 (2013).
3. GARY BORN, INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 768 (Viki Been
et al. eds., Ist ed. 2011).
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evidentiary process, particularly in determining the facts being
disputed and the ability of the arbitral tribunal to support its decision
based on the different evidence presented by the parties.4 The widely
accepted rule in international commercial arbitration is that each party
has to prove the facts on which it relies to support its case.5 In practice,
each side tends to offer evidence to prove their own case and
disprove the facts put forth by the other.
There is also no doubt that the burden of proof rules require
special consideration in any adversarial adjudicative proceeding
where one side or the other must prove its case.6 Moreover, the
burden can be highly determinative, especially in close decisions
where a party fails to satisfy its burden of proof might end up having
its claim dismissed. As stated, "decisions about the burden of proof
are often critical for the result of the proceeding and the findings in
the award and securing access to justice especially if the evidence is
scarce, and thus they have a due process connection."7
Notwithstanding the aforementioned, there is not a great amount
of academic literature regarding the definition, allocation, scope, and
implications of the burden of proof in international commercial
arbitration.' In fact, most institutional rules and authors are silent as to
what this concept really means.' This article aims to contribute to the
academic discussion by analyzing the limits of the parties' authority
to modify the burden of proof rules in international commercial
arbitration practice, as well as the arbitral tribunals' powers
regarding this issue.
4. Ali Z. Marossi, Shifting the Burden of Proof in the Practice of the Iran-United
States Claims Tribunal, 28 J. INT'L ARB. 427 (2011).
5. Alan Redfern, The Practical Distinction Between the Burden of Proof and the
Taking ofEvidence - An English Perspective, 10 ARB. INT'L 317, 321 (1994).
6. Kenneth Beck, Note, Evidence, Burden and Quantum of Proof 1949 WASH. U. L.
REv. 85, 89 (1949).
7. MATTI S. KURKELA & SANTTU TURUNEN, DUE PROCESS IN INTERNATIONAL
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 147 (2d ed. 2010).
8. Winarta, supra note 1, at 4 ("Despite its importance, it is interesting that in
international commercial arbitration proceedings, the burden of proof between the parties is
not explicitly defined.").
9. Redfern, supra note 5, at 321.
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II. The Burden of Proof
This section defines the concept of burden of proof, as it has
been generally understood in the legal science and practice, in order
to later address the issue of determining how it has been specifically
applied in the field of international commercial arbitration.
A. Definition of Burden of Proof
"Burden of proof' is a complex legal term that is not equally
defined in all jurisdictions and is susceptible of being illustrated in
different ways.'0 The challenge of clarifying its meaning is connatural
to the juridical nature of international commercial arbitration, a system
consisting of a "hybrid process formed by a delicate balance between
different legal cultures and systems."II
Despite the divergence of interpretations, the concept of burden
of proof has been generally understood as a mechanism for
distributing risks in the context of an adjudicating procedure, which
enables the tribunal to make a decision based on the evidence
submitted in the record and provides legal certainty to the parties
with regards to their evidentiary responsibilities in the proceeding.12
More precisely, the burden of proof can be characterized as the
"legal mechanism that allocates the obligation of establishing facts
between the parties by determining which of them bears the risk of a
given allegation not being upheld and the claim relying on it [being]
dismissed.""
In other words, the burden of proof refers to the rule that allows
the tribunal to solve the controversy in favor of the party who does
not bear it, in case the evidence presented is not sufficient enough to
10. Victor H. Lane, Burden of Proof UNIv. MICH. L. SCH. SCHOLARSHIP REPOSITORY,
264 (1919).
11. Francisco Rodriguez, ICCA 2014. Standard of Proof A Plea for Precision or an
Unnecessary Remedy?, KLUWER ARBITRATION BLOG, http://kluwerarbitrationblog.com/ blog/20
14/04/10/icca-2014-standard-of-proof-a-plea-for-precision-or-an-unnecessary-remedy/ (last visited
Nov. 13, 2015).
12. Hanns Pritting, Carga de la Prueba y Estdndar Probatorio: La Influencia de Leo
Rosenberg y Karl Hainz Schwab para el desarrollo del moderno derecho probatorio, 161
IUS ET PRAXIs, 453-464 (2010).
13. Makarius, supra note 3, at 54-55.
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provide conviction of the issue under discussion.14 These rules serve
as important guidelines to overcome the challenges to which a court
or tribunal might be subject when deciding a dispute." An author has
explained the following regarding the notion of burden of proof:
Burden of proof often means what Wigmore has called the
risk of non-persuasion. Wherever in human affairs a
question of the existence or non-existence of a fact is to be
decided by somebody, there is the possibility that the
decider, or trier of the fact, may at the end of his
deliberations be in doubt on the question submitted to
him. On all the material before him, he may, for example,
regard the existence or nonexistence of the fact as equally
likely a matter in equipoise. If, now, the trier is operating
under a system which requires him to decide the question
one way or the other, then to avoid caprice that system
must furnish him with a rule for deciding the question
when he finds his mind in this kind of doubt or
equipoise.16
In any system that claims to adjudicate rights among competing
sides, the outcome of the decision will ultimately depend on whether
the evidence presented satisfies a predetermined burden and a
standard of proof." Such rules are essential for having a decision
based on objective standards, rather than impulse or chance. As
stated, "no lawsuit can be decided, rationally, without the application
of the common place concept of burden of proof."" In the end, the
burden of proof rules are intended to help guarantee that a rational
decision is reached. They play an important role in every case,
14. Carga de la prueba, ENCICLOPEDIA JURIDICA (Sept. 6, 2015), http://www.encic
lopedia-juridica.bizl4.com/d/carga-de-la-prueba/carga-de-la-prueba.htm (last visited Nov.
13, 2015).
15. See Francis H. Bohlen, The Effect of Rebuttable Presumptions of Law Upon the
Burden ofProof 68 U. PA. L. REv. 307 (1920).
16. Fleming James Jr., Burdens of Proof YALE L. SCH. LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP REPOSITORY
51(1961).
17. Louis Kaplow, Burden ofProof 121 YALE L.J. 738, 741 (2012).
18. J. P. McBaine, Burden ofProof Degrees ofBelief 32. CALIF. L. REv. 242 (1944).
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especially in those having unclear or incomplete evidence, where
their application may determine the outcome of the dispute.19
B. Burden of Proof in International Commercial Arbitration
Due to the different legal definitions of burden of proof, there has
been little consensus found regarding the scope and allocation of said
obligation in the field of international commercial arbitration.
Generally, it has been accepted that a party relying on a particular fact,
has to establish it. This is just a modem manifestation of the Roman
law maxim ei qui affirmat non ei qui negat incumbit probatio, which
states that the burden of proof lies upon him who affirms, not upon
him who denies.2 0 In other words, each party must prove the facts
upon which it relies to support its case.21
It is possible to characterize the burden of proof in international
commercial arbitration as the parties' procedural obligation before the
arbitral tribunal to prove their own claims.22 Although no international
rules exist to divide the burden of proof responsibilities' between the
parties of an international arbitration, ultimately everyone agrees that
the party who asserts a fact is obliged to prove it.23 When the burden is
met, the arbitral tribunal gives the other party the opportunity to
"explain himself in order to create eventually in his turn a contrary
likelihood." 24
The principle of actori incumbit probatio in international
commercial arbitration requires the claimant to establish the elements
of fact to obtain a decision in its favor. Somehow, all legal systems
recognize this rule or at least a variation of the principle that a party
putting forward an allegation must demonstrate its elements of fact
19. Caroline E. Foster, Burden of Proof in International Courts and Tribunals, 29
AUST. YBIL. 27,29 (2010).
20. Makarius, supra note 2, at 55.
21. Anne Wronique Schlaepfer, The Burden of Proof in International Arbitration, in
LEGITIMACY: MYTHS, REALITIES, CHALLENGES 127 (Albert Jan van den Berg ed. 2015).
22. Marossi, supra note 4, at 427.
23. Id.
24. Abhinav Bhushan, Standard and Burden of Proof in International Commercial
Arbitration: Is There a Bright Line Rule?, 25 THE AM. REV. OF INT'L ARB. 601, 604 (2014).
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and sometimes of law as well.25 Some authors have explained that
the tribunals "will formally require the party putting forward a claim
or a particular contention to establish the elements of fact and of law
on which a decision in its favor might be given."26 The
aforementioned principle can be observed in international arbitration
case law, as illustrated by the International Court of Justice in the
Temple of Preah Vihear case, where it held:
As concerns the burden of proof it must be pointed out
that though, from the formal standpoint, Cambodia is the
plaintiff having instituted the proceedings, Thailand also
is a claimant because of the claim which was presented by
her in the second Submission of the Counter-Memorial
and which relates to the sovereignty over the same piece
of territory. Both Cambodia and Thailand base their
respective claims on a series of facts and contentions
which are asserted or put forward by one Party or the
other. The burden of proof in respect of these will of
course lie on the Party asserting or putting them forward.2 7
In addition to international arbitration case law, the principle of
actori incumbit probatio can be observed in the arbitration rules of
different institutions.28 For instance, Article 27, section 1 of the
UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules ("UNCITRAL Rules") provides that
each one of the parties "shall have the burden of proving the facts
relied on to support its claim or defen[s]e." As explained by Redfern
and Hunter, the rule applied by "nearly all international arbitral
tribunals is to require each party to prove the facts upon which it
25. Marossi, supra note 4, at 427.
26. Foster, supra note 19, at 35.
27. Case Concerning the Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v. Thailand), 1962 I.C.J.
6, 13-14 (June 2015).
28. See Winarta, supra note 1, at 4 ("None of the international arbitration rules contain
a provision concerning burden of proof, except for the American Arbitration Association
("AAA") International Arbitration Rules and the United Nations Commission on
International Trade Law ("UNCITRAL") Rules. Those regulations stipulate that each party
has the burden of proving the facts relied on to support its claim or defense, with the only
exception related to the propositions that are so obvious, or notorious, that proof is not
required.").
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relies in support of its case. This practice is recognized in the
UNCITRAL Rules. The only exceptions relate to propositions that
are so obvious, so notorious, that proof is not required."29
In a similar way, Article 24, section 1 of the regulation for
international arbitration of the Arbitration and Mediation Center of
the Chamber of Commerce of Santiago (Chile) provides that "each
party shall have the burden of proof regarding the facts in which its
allegations or defenses are based."30 In turn, Article 34 of the
arbitration rules of the Mediation and Commercial Arbitration Centre
of the Argentinian Chamber of Commerce states that "each party
shall assume the burden of proving the facts or exceptions on which
its claims or defenses are based," while Article 27 of the arbitration
rules of the Australian Centre for International Commercial
Arbitration mandates that, "each party shall have the burden of
proving the facts relied upon to support its claim or defen[s]e."
The problem is that in almost every case there are different
claims, defenses, and counterclaims that usually involve intertwined
material facts. This poses a great challenge to the parties and the
arbitrators because the plain application of general principles is
rendered insufficient to apply to more complex cases. Notwithstanding
the common recognition of the principle of actori incumbitprobatio in
international commercial arbitration, such a general definition of
burden of proof does not provide further explanations that may help
determine, for instance, which party has the burden of going forward
with the arbitration, or who has the burden of persuading the arbitral
tribunal that its allegations are true.
The burden of going forward addresses the issue of when proof
29. ALAN REDFERN & MARTIN HUNTER, LAW AND PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 314 (3d ed. 1999).
30. See Reglamento Arbitraje Internacional, CENTRO DE ARBITRAJE Y MEDIACION DE
SANTIAGO (2006) at 21, http://www.camsantiago.com/files/reglamento arbitraje_interna
cionalen.pdf (last visited Nov. 13, 2015); see also Rules of International Arbitration,
SANTIAGO ARBITRATION AND MEDIATION CENTER - SANTIAGO CHAMBER OF COMMERCE
(June 2006) at 21, http://www.camsantiago.com/files/reglamento arbitraje internacion
al-en.pdf (last visited Nov. 13, 2015); see also Swiss Rules of International Arbitration,
SwIss CHAMBERS' ARBITRATION INSTITUTION, June 2012 at 20, https://www.swissarb
itration.org/sa/download/SRIA-english_2012.pdf (last visited Nov. 13, 2015) (The Swiss
rules of international arbitration of the Swiss Chambers' Arbitration Institutions states in its
Article 24 that "Each party shall have the burden of proving the facts relied on to support its
claim or defense.").
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should be presented by a party; or put more simply, the order in
which the evidence must be presented. As one author explains, one
of the primary issues within the scope of burden of proof is to
determine which party bears the weight of proving the facts and
should assume the duty of "providing the evidence" to the arbitral
tribunal.
Unlike the burden of going forward that only addresses the
moment in which evidence should be submitted, the burden of
persuading the arbitral tribunal is ultimately referred to demonstrating
that the allegations are true. Indeed, in order to obtain a favorable
judgment, each party needs to convince the arbitrators of the
effectiveness or truthfulness of the facts relied on to support its claim
or defense. The burden of persuading the arbitral tribunal is fixed by
the issues presented in the case and the applicable legal rules because
it governs the standard to be applied by the arbitrators in establishing
the facts upon which the final award will rest.3 1
Some authors have emphasized the importance of determining
whether the burden of going forward and the burden of persuading
the arbitral tribunal always rests on the same party. For instance, one
scholar has stated the following:
The "Burden of Proof' contains the alpha and omega of
the inquiry into the facts. It imposes on the arbitrator two
rules which can be stated as two questions: "Who has the
burden of going forward?" and "Who has the burden of
persuasion?" Which side must introduce the factual
inquiry into the arbitration and which side must present
the evidence necessary to convince the finder of fact that
its version of the ultimate fact is to be accepted as the
truth? These two burdens frequently, but not always, are
borne by the same party.32
In the end, despite the agreement in international commercial
31. Robert B. von Mehren, Burden of Proof in International Arbitration, PLANNING
EFFICIENT ARBITRATION PROCEEDINGS: THE LAW APPLICABLE IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION
123 (Albert Jan van den Berg ed., 1996).
32. Id.
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arbitration practice regarding the application of the principle of actori
incumbitprobatio, developing the scope of the burden of proof rules is
essential to answer questions surrounding how and when a party has
discharged its burden in a particular case.
Among the efforts in the aforementioned sense, it is extremely
important to determine if the parties and the arbitrators are allowed
to modify the burden of proof rules and whether such decisions affect
the inherent powers of the arbitral tribunal. There is no legal system
that could be praised if there is no predictability or "if there [is]
vagueness, uncertainty or confusion as to the scope or extent of the
burden [of proof], or if the language commonly employed to describe
its scope or extent is not easily comprehensible to those whose duty
it is to determine whether the burden has been sustained."3 3
III. The Possibility of the Parties to Modify
the Burden of Proof Rules
As explained below, the possibility of the parties to modify the
burden of proof rules is supported by the principle of party autonomy,
the juridical nature of international commercial arbitration, and the
goals pursued by said institution.
A. The Principle of Party Autonomy and the Burden of Proof
Rules
Arbitration is a creature of contract. In the field of private
international law, few principles are more recognized than the one
entitling the parties to establish the law of the contract, having
"[arbitral] tribunals, international conventions and national laws
accord a primary place to the will of the parties when deciding the
applicable substantive and procedural law to an arbitration."34 As
stated by an author:
33. McBaine, supra note 18, at 242.
34. Andrew Barraclough & Jeff Waincymer, Mandatory Rules of Law in International
Commercial Arbitration, 6 MELB. J. INT'L L. 205, 216-17 (2005).
2016]1 51
Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.
Party autonomy is the guiding principle in determining the
procedure to be followed in an international commercial
arbitration. It is a principle that has been endorsed not
only in national laws, but by international arbitral
institutions and organizations. The legislative history of
the Model Law shows that the principle was adopted
without opposition.3 5
Consequently, there is little that the parties should not be able to
do or modify in the context of an international commercial arbitration.
For instance, they have the opportunity to choose the procedural rules
that will be applied in the process of resolving the dispute, the law
governing the contract, and the forum of the arbitration. They may
even appoint decision-makers who will settle the conflict and the
language to be used during the proceedings, along with many other
essential issues.3 6 Furthermore, it has been sustained that the principle
of party autonomy is broader in the field of international commercial
arbitration than in other areas of law, as observed from the following
excerpt:
The principle of party autonomy, in general sense,
started to develop in the nineteenth century. Actually,
party autonomy is based on choice of law in a contract.
However, this principle has broader meaning in
international commercial arbitration. In other words, the
parties to the arbitration agreement are free not only to
choose laws but also to conduct the arbitration process.37
35. ALAN REDFERN, MARTIN HUNTER, NIGEL BLACKABY, & CONSTANTINE PARTASIDES,
LAW AND PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 265 (4th ed. 2004). See
also Olena S. Perepelynska, Party Autonomy vs. Mandatory Rules in International
Arbitration, UKR. J. Bus. L. 38 (2012), http://www.sk.ualsites/default/files/perepelynska1-
2_2012.pdf (last visited Nov. 13, 2015).
36. Adrian Roberto Villagmoez Aleman, Review of The Principles and Practice of
International Commercial Arbitration by L. Moses, 31 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 461 (2013).
37. Seyda Dursun G6r. A Critical Examination of the Role of Party Autonomy in
International Commercial Arbitration and an Assessment of its Role and Extent (Sept. 6,
2015), http://www.yalova.edu.tr/Files/UserFiles/83/8_Dursun.pdf (last visited Nov. 13,
2015).
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As it can be noted, the theory suggests that the parties should
have broad powers to determine how the arbitration is going to
proceed, including the authority to change the burden of proof rules.
Indeed, it has been stated that "party autonomy is a major factor in
determining the rules of evidence, including those on the burden of
proof"38 Thus, the parties can shift the existing burden, alleviate or
increase the standards that must be met, define which elements a party
will need to prove, or determine the level of evidence they will be
required to submit to succeed on its claims.39
For example, the parties can agree to apply liquidated damages
for delays in a construction project. In such a case, the owner will only
need to prove the breach of the contract on the part of the contractor
(the delay), yet he will be relieved from demonstrating damages. The
parties might also agree that such a breach will only give right to
damages if the party failed to perform with willful misconduct or gross
negligence. In that scenario, the claimant will need to prove both the
breach and the willful misconduct or gross negligence.
The general approach concludes that the parties are authorized to
expand, limit, or waive almost any arbitration-related right, and
consequently, are free to modify the burden and standard of proof in
the way they consider appropriate.
B. The Juridical Nature of International Commercial Arbitration
Supports the Parties' Authority to Modify the Burden of Proof
Rules
Many theories have been given to explain the juridical nature of
international arbitration. Some conceive it as a consequence of the
power of states to allow privately administered justice systems within
their territories, while others find in arbitration a purely contractual
character.4 0 Determining whether the arbitration derives from state
power or contractual agreement is not a trivial matter because each
38. MOJTABA KAZAZI, BURDEN OF PROOF AND RELATED ISSUES: A STUDY ON EVIDENCE
BEFORE INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNALS 3 (Kluwer L. Int'l 1996).
39. Schlaepfer, supra note 21.
40. JULIAN D. M. LEW, ET AL., JURIDICAL NATURE OF ARBITRATION 71, 71 (Kluwer L.
Int'l 2003).
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standpoint might take different approaches as to the extent of the
arbitral tribunal's powers and the limits to the parties' autonomy to
determine how their dispute is going to be decided. However, this is
not an easy task as both positions have solid arguments to support
their statements.41
Somewhere in the middle ground are those arguing that the
jurisdictional and the contractual standpoints can be reconciled in a
hybrid theory.42 They note that international arbitration relies on
elements from both theories, since arbitrations have their origins in a
private contract, but there is also domestic law that determines the
validity of the agreements to arbitrate and the enforceability of the
awards.43 As some authors have stated, for "pragmatic reasons, a
compromise has emerged which recognizes arbitration as a hybrid of
the two extremes."44
The most recent theory, however, suggests that international
arbitration has an autonomous juridical nature because it cannot be
classified as purely contractual or jurisdictional, nor should it be
subject to a localized law. They believe that international arbitration
operates in the arena of the international business world in which the
need for flexibility, predictability, and fair procedures is opposed to
national public policy or mandatory laws.45
Whatever theory one might adhere to, what seems to be
undisputed is that the rules governing the arbitration depend
primarily on the parties' agreement,46  and therefore, special
deference shall be given to their decisions regarding different
procedural and substantive issues, which includes the burden of
proof. In this regard, it is worth quoting an author that explains the
41. EDUARDO PICAND, ARBITRAJE COMERCIAL INTERNACIONAL VOL. 1, 45 (2005).
42. Lew, supra note 40, at 78-79.
43. Id. at 86.
44. Barraclough, supra note 34, at 207.
45. Lew, supra note 40, at 81.
46. Barraclough, supra note 34, at 209-10 (Notwithstanding that we acknowledge the
fact that the closer arbitration is to the contractual theories that explains its juridical nature;
more weight shall be given to the autonomy of the parties. As stated, "The closer in
proximity arbitrators are to the contractual end of the continuum, the less inclined they will
be to deny party autonomy, and vice versa.").
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harmonic relationship existing between the dispositive principle of
the arbitral process and the juridical nature of the arbitral institution:
This principle is fully justified in international commercial
arbitration, due to its juridical nature, that is, an institution
aimed to resolve private interpersonal conflicts. Indeed,
we well know that the parties are the ones that, through
their autonomy, decide to exclude from an ordinary judge
the controversies derived from a particular private right
that they could freely dispose, with the purpose that, in the
end, an arbitral tribunal solve the dispute. This freedom
owned by the parties has enabled them to conduct the
process and the procedure through their own elections; in
a way that the start of the procedure, the submission of
evidence, and the continuity of the process would be
under their control. In international commercial
arbitration, more than in any other jurisdictional
procedure, the parties own the impulse of the process,
being the tribunal activity subsidiary to a lack of
agreement by the parties.47
Ultimately, it is clear that special deference should be given to the
parties' authority to determine the legal framework of the proceedings.
One of the greatest advantages to international arbitration is that the
parties can agree on the substantive and procedural rules that will
govern the arbitral process.
C. International Commercial Arbitration Aims to Be an Efficient
Tool
The principle of party autonomy and the promise of broad control
over the arbitration proceedings have contributed significantly to
promoting international arbitration as one of the most convenient
means of dispute resolution in the transnational context.4 8 Indeed, the
47. Picand, supra note 41.
48. Mia Louise Livingstone, Party Autonomy in International Commercial Arbitration:
Popular Fallacy or Proven Fact? 25 (5) J. INT'L ARB. 529, 529 (2008).
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ability of the parties to determine the arbitral procedure - with the
informality and flexibility that comes with it - has been pointed out
as one of the great advantages of arbitration over domestic
litigation.49 In this context, the capability of the parties to shift the
burden of proof is supported by the purpose that the institution of
international commercial arbitration was construed upon, that is, to
develop an efficient system of settling disputes in the transnational
business world.
IV. Limits to the Parties' Authority to
Modify the Burden of Proof Rules
The parties' authority to master the arbitration procedure has
been widely accepted within some boundsso and "subject to some
restrictions."" The primary limitations to the parties' authority to
modify the burden of proof rules are given by the principle requiring
that both sides must be treated fairly and equally and by the
mandatory rules applicable to a particular international commercial
arbitration.52 In addition, considerations of public policy, good faith,
and external interpretation among other circumstances have also been
syndicated as boundaries to the parties' autonomy to modify the
burden of proof rules.
A. Fair and Equal Treatment of the Parties
Perhaps the most important requirement for any international
commercial arbitration procedure is that both parties must be treated
fairly and equally, giving them the opportunity to adequately present
their case,53 as clearly stated in Article 18 of the UNCITRAL Model
49. Sergio A.Villamayor Aleman, La Prueba en el Arbitraje (Sept. 6, 2015),
http://www.colabogados.org.ar/larevista/pdfs/idl4/la-prueba-en-el-arbitraje.pdf (last visited
Nov. 13, 2015).
50. Perepelinska, supra note 35, at 39.
51. GOr, supra note 37.
52. However, as we will observe later in this work, public policy norms are not
necessarily equal to mandatory norms. Therefore, it is possible to consider both of them as
separate limitations to the autonomy of the parties to control the arbitration.
53. Redfern, supra note 5, at 321.
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Law. The same restrictions to party autonomy might arise from the
institutional rules that govern the arbitration. Therefore, if the burden
of proof rules are structured by the parties in a way that makes it
impossible, or unreasonably burdensome, for one side to have the
ability to present its case with a real chance to obtain a favorable
award, then such an agreement should be deemed inapplicable - null
or void according to what the relevant law considers a proper
remedy.
Moreover, the arbitrators should not tolerate an unfair procedure
because it might be the basis for refusing the recognition and
enforcement of the final award under the New York Convention.
Indeed, Article V of the convention establishes that recognition and
enforcement of an award may be refused when it "would be contrary
to the public policy" of the country where recognition and
enforcement is sought. The UNCITRAL Model Law, which was
adopted in sixty-seven states and a total of ninety-seven jurisdictions,
contains a similar provision.14
International arbitration cannot operate in a vacuum. Accordingly,
unequal treatment based on international law or public policy, is an
argument that may be invoked by a party to argue that altering the
laws governing burden of proof could warrant setting aside an arbitral
award.
B. Mandatory Norms
An accepted classification of the rules regulating a particular
international commercial arbitration is one that distinguishes
between those that can be changed by the parties involved and those
that "purport to apply irrespective of the law chosen by the parties to
govern their contractual relations."" The norms in the first group are
known as dispositive, while the others are called mandatory. The
difference between them has been explained in the following terms:
54. UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration (1985), with
amendments as adopted in 2006, UNCITRAL, http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/unc
itral texts/arbitration/1985Model arbitration status.html (last visited on Oct. 2, 2015)
(hereafter "UNCITRAL Model Law").
55. Barraclough, supra note 34, at 205.
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Peremptory (mandatory), as opposed to dispositive (non-
peremptory, non-mandatory, jus dispositivum) norms,
are those norms from which non-derogation is allowed.
Whereas dispositive norms envisage a model of behavior
from which derogation is allowed if parties (e.g. parties
to a contract) wish to do so. It should also be kept in
mind that the concept of mandatory norms "has at its
basis special importance for [the] particular state of
social relations constituting [the] subject matter of these
norm[']s regulation.5 6
The distinction between mandatory and dispositive norms is of
huge relevance in the field of international commercial arbitration
because the former imposes important restrictions to parties'
authority to define the arbitration framework. In fact, this discussion
has been declared as "one of the most burning issues in daily
international arbitration practice,"57 especially because of the current
trend in which states are increasingly adopting mandatory norms
(having been told, anecdotally,that issues regarding mandatory
norms "arise in over 50 percent of cases").58
Despite its relevance, distinguishing between mandatory and
dispositive norms is not an easy task. As stated:
Party autonomy is a guiding principle in determining the
procedure to be followed in international commercial
arbitration. An important practical question in this regard
concerns actual limits to party autonomy. The parties shall
comply with respective mandatory requirements
established by law governing arbitration agreement in
respect to both form and content of the latter. But the
UNCITRAL Model Law, as well as national laws based
on it, including Ukrainian legislation, provide no guidance
56. Oleksandr Merezhko, Public Policy (Ordre Public), Mandatory Norms and Evasion
of Law in Ukranian Private International Law, CZECH & CENTRAL EuR. Y.B. OF ARB. 154
(2013).
57. Barraclough, supra note 34, at 207.
58. Id. at 207-08.
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on how to divide its provisions into mandatory and
dispositive rules. In some Model Law jurisdictions the
parties may waive the right to set aside future arbitral
awards, while in others, including Ukraine, it is not
permitted. The majority of institutional rules establish
certain limitations with regard to procedures of
appointment and challenge of arbitrators. But still some
questions remain unclear, such as how a rule should be
qualified which is not designed so apparently dispositive
and does not mention the parties' agreement, and if the
parties have agreed on certain issues whether such
agreement is always binding for the arbitral tribunal.59
As it can be seen, determining what is mandatory and what is
dispositive law might also be different between jurisdictions. Under
Chilean law there are mandatory law issues that should be considered
in the international commercial arbitration practice. Chilean authors
have explained that here are certain procedural rights that cannot be
waived or limited, such as, the right to request interim relief.60
Accordingly, the arbitral proceeding must comply with the
applicable mandatory rules of law. Furthermore, there is even an
international debate regarding the strictness of the actual limits
created by mandatory norms on the parties' autonomy to set the rules
of the arbitration. Some have a more flexible approach, while others
tend to believe that the mandatory laws should always be respected.61
Determining the juridical nature of the burden of proof rules is
of the essence because generally mandatory rules have been
developed with the purpose of overriding the parties' agreement for
different policy considerations.62 Article 19 of the UNCITRAL
59. Perepelynska, supra note 35.
60. BRUNO CAPRILE, LA BOLETA BANCARIA DE GARANTiA. UNA GARANTIA A PRIMER
REQUERIMIENTO 212, EDITORIAL JURIDICA DE CHILE (2002).
61. Barraclough, supra note 34, at 224-225, 226 (Whatever is the case, it seems at least
convenient that the parties and the arbitral tribunal respect the mandatory norms governing
the seat of the arbitration, the place where the award wants to be enforced and of the place
of performance).
62. When there is inequality of bargaining power in the contract and the weaker party
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Model Law confirms this interpretation as it provides that, "the
parties are free to agree on the procedure to be followed by the
arbitral tribunal in conducting the proceedings," however "subject to
the provisions of this Law." Therefore, if the norms dictating the
scope and/or allocation of the burden of proof are considered
mandatory rules under the applicable law then the parties are
prevented from changing them. Conversely, the parties will have the
possibility of amending such norms only if they are deemed
dispositive. In other words, considering the burden of proof rules as
mandatory norms could limit the parties' autonomy to modify them.
C. Public Policy
Some argue that public policy rules are not necessarily the same
as mandatory norms because "a domestic mandatory rule does not
fall within the relevant definition of public policy,"63 and therefore,
they could be considered an additional limit to the parties' authority
to modify burden of proof rules. In any case, scholars agree that the
parties cannot go against the public policy of a country. This has
been recognized by legal doctrine and the most important
intemational arbitration treaties that deal with the enforcement of the
final awards.64 For example, Article V of the New York Convention
provides that an arbitral award may be unenforceable when it goes
against the public policy of the country where recognition and
enforcement is being sought.65
should be protected (i.e., employment agreements or consumer contracts), when there is a
need to protect the public good (i.e., criminal or tax disputes), or when the recourse to the
courts is ensured by domestic laws.
63. Barraclough, supra note 34, at 215 (The referred authors stated the aforementioned
in the following terms: "One problem for arbitrators seeking to evaluate the potential for
enforcement o be successfully challenged is that the New York Convention does not define
'public policy.' Most states regard 'public policy' as referring to international public policy
but this view is not uniform. Where the view applies, it may be that a domestic mandatory
rule does not fall within the relevant definition of public policy. There may also be different
views as to the content of such policy and the likely application to particular facts.").
64. See id. at 217 (Or as the words from Maniruzzaman quoted by Barraclough and
Wayncimer warns us: "Although the parties' freedom of choice is a general principle of
private international law and is to be respected in principle, it should operate within the
limits imposed by such equally important general principles of law or subject to any
restraint of public policy.").
65. New York Convention, Art. V 2 (Indeed, article V(2)(b) provides the following:
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Due to the inherent limitations of international arbitration, both
the parties and the arbitral tribunal are forced to consider several
policy issues including the position of the domestic courts regarding
the enforcement of the award. As explained by certain scholars:
[T]he philosophy underlying arbitration is that questions
of procedural and substantive laws are best answered by
the parties themselves. The parties of an international
arbitration certainly have the flexibility to agree on
substantive alternatives to a national system of law to best
redress the issues between them. However, the parties'
freedom to choose their governing law will be rendered
futile if it is subsequently incapable of being enforced by
the courts.6 6
In the end, behind the freedom of the parties and the powers of
the arbitral tribunal, we can find the need to protect the award from
becoming unenforceable under the domestic laws. Policy issues arise
from the position taken by states in areas like competition, insurance
law, and labor law. In those cases, the parties' agreement is limited
by the policy underlying the statutes, which usually seeks to protect
the weaker party. The same can be said from matters that cannot be
subject to arbitration in some jurisdictions, such as criminal, tax,
administrative, or family disputes.
From a procedural standpoint, we can easily find policy issues
as well, particularly regarding due process in the course of
international commercial arbitrations. As one author stated, at its
"most fundamental level, the concept refers to the idea that no one
should be deprived of his rights without due process of law." 67
Therefore, every procedure must comply with certain standards.
Even though this concept originally emerged as a way to protect
individuals from sovereign power, the fact that states have authorized
"Recognition and enforcement of an arbitral award may also be refused if the competent
authority in the country where recognition and enforcement is sought finds that [...]: (b) The
recognition or enforcement of the award would be contrary to the public policy of that
country.").
66. Livingstone, supra note 48, at 531.
67. Kurkela, supra note 7, at 1.
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a delegation of their jurisdictional powers to arbitrators is enough to
warrant due process standards. As it has been explained, "with this
delegation of powers comes a type of trade-off in the form of
standards of quality applicable to arbitration."68
Both the New York Convention and the UNCITRAL Model
Law seek to ensure due process; or, what has been considered in
international arbitration as fair and just proceedings between the
parties. The appointment of the arbitrators may be invalid if they
show a bias towards one of the parties (Article V(1)(b) of the New
York Convention and article 12(1) of the Model Law) and the
proceeding may be void if one of the parties was not given proper
notice of the arbitration (Article V(1)(b) of the New York
Convention).
The burden of proof rules are also permeable to such policy
considerations. The aim of due process or fairness, rather than
equality per se, is one of the strongest concerns as a guiding
principle that has conducted the development of an international rule
relating to the burden of proof.69 Whether it is in the name of "due
process," "natural justice," or "fair and just treatment," the award
may be unenforceable if the parties agree on procedural issues
(including burden of proof rules) that prevent one of them from
adequately presenting their case or that override public policy
concerns.70
D. Good Faith
Under the good faith principle, arbitration agreements must
respect the rights of both contracting parties, regardless of any
possible power, position or negotiating imbalance.n7 This guideline
restriction is no surprise considering that the concept of good faith in
international arbitration can be understood as a moral principle
"reflective of all good senses such as honesty, good conscience,
68. Id.
69. Foster, supra note 19, at 35.
70. Livingstone, supra note 48, at 532.
71. Johannes Trappe, The Arbitration Proceedings: Fundamental Principles and Rights
of the Parties, 15 J. INT'L ARB. 93, 97 (1998).
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fairness, equity, reasonableness, equitable dealing or fair dealing."7 2
To summarize, it is possible to argue that any alterations of the burden
of proof by the parties must be done in good faith or in other words,
that modifications to the burden of proof cannot be done in bad faith.
E. Burden of Proof as a Substantive or Procedural Law Issue and
Its Effect on the Parties'Agreement
The taking of evidence is usually considered to be a procedural
issue, governed by the laws applicable to the arbitration proceeding.
However, the burden of proof rules reside in a grey zone between
procedural and substantive law. In some legal systems they will be
governed by the law governing the arbitration, while in others the
arbitrators will apply the law that governs the merits of the case.73
The UNCITRAL Model Law did not include a clear approach
regarding this issue because the Commission accepted that certain
matters of the burden of proof could be regarded as issues of
substantive rather than procedural aw.74
As presented below, determining if the burden of proof amounts
to a procedural or a substantive norm has implications on the
likelihood that an arbitral tribunal would uphold the parties'
agreement modifying those rules. This is, however, not an easy task,
bringing a great challenge within the limits of the "insatiable quest to
categorize an issue as procedural or substantive."75 To address this
matter, we will first refer to the distinction between substantive and
procedural norms. Second, we will explain the implications of
considering burden of proof as a procedural or a substantive norm to
finally express the arguments that lead us to conclude that the burden
of proof rules are intertwined both with substantive and procedural
law.
72. Munir Maniruzzaman, The Concept of Good Faith in International Investment
Disputes - The Arbitrator's Dilemma, KLUWER ARBITRATION BLOG (2012), http://kluw erar
bitrationblog.com/blog/2012/04/30/the-concept-of-good-faith-in-intemational-investment-di
sputes-%E2%80%93-the-arbitrator%E2%80%99s-dilemma-2/(last visi ed Nov. 13, 2015).
73. Julian D. M. Lew, et al., Taking Evidence in International Arbitration, CoMP. INT'L
Com. ARB., KLUWER L. INT'L, 559 (2003).
74. Id. at 560.
75. Rodriguez, supra note 11.
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1. The Distinction Between Procedural and Substantive Norms
In order to determine the nature of a particular norm, it is most
important to understand its function - rather than where it is
located.7 6 As one author stated in the criminal law context, "an
accurate distinction between procedural and substantive criminal
norms must be based on the purpose of the specific norms."77
Therefore, one logical way of distinguishing substantive from
procedural norms is by their definitions. Substantive laws are the
ones aimed at regulating the rights, powers and duties of the parties,
while procedural norms are more related to "the rules the parties
must follow as they bring their case and the rules for the courts'
administration."7 1 In other words, substantive norms regulate the
rights and obligations between parties, while procedural rules set
chronological steps to enforce those rights and obligations through
the administration of justice.
2. Implications of Considering the Burden of ProofRules as
Substantive or Procedural Norms
Determining whether the burden of proof rules in international
commercial arbitration are substantive or procedural is relevant
because it affects the chances that the parties' agreement will be
respected by the arbitrators. In other words, it affects the parties'
autonomy by defining the arbitrators' approach when reviewing
76. Jos6 Mario Rizo & Pablo Altamirano, Normas sustantivas y adjetivas: Breve anilisis
desde la 6ptica del CFF (2013), http://www.dofiscal.net/pdf/doctrina/DDPFRV_2013_219-
Al8.pdf (last visited Nov. 13, 2015).
77. GABRIEL HALLEVY, A MODERN TREATISE ON THE PRINCIPLE OF LEGALITY IN CRIMINAL
LAW 50 (Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg eds., 1st ed. 2010) (In this regard the referred
author states the following: "An accurate distinction between procedural and substantive
criminal norms must be based on the purpose of the specific norm. The purpose of the
substantive criminal norm is to define the criminal liability, whereas the purpose of the
procedural criminal norm is to impose the defined criminal liability. Thus, the major
question in the distinction between substantive and procedural norms is about the purpose of
the specific norm. In many cases there are interactions between various types of criminal
norms, but the purposes of these norms still remain different.").
78. Kristin B. Gerdy, What is the Difference Between Substantive and Procedural Law
and How do I Research Procedure?, TEACHABLE MOMENTS FOR STUDENTS (2000). http:// in
fo.legalsolutions.thomsonreuters.com/pdfperspec/2000-fall/2000-fall-3.pdf (last visited Nov.
13, 2015).
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these types of agreements.79
On the one hand, if the burden of proof is considered a
procedural norm it is likely that the tribunal would be forced to
uphold the parties' agreement. Otherwise, if the arbitral tribunal does
not apply the procedure agreed by the parties, the award could be
rendered useless under Article V, section 1, part d of the New York
Convention. This norm provides that the recognition and
enforcement of the award may be refused when "the arbitral
procedure was not in accordance with the agreement of the parties or,
failing such agreement, was not in accordance with the law of the
country where the arbitration took place."80
However, even if the burden of proof rules are considered a
matter of procedural law, it could be argued that the parties' autonomy
is not absolute. The arbitral tribunal should not apply whatever unfair
burden of proof rules the parties might have agreed upon. Indeed, to
avoid any possible challenges, the arbitrators should be cautious when
reviewing the parties' agreement to ensure that both sides have been
given the opportunity to adequately present their case. Otherwise, the
enforceability of the award might be at risk.
On the other hand, if the burden of proof is a matter of
substantive law, then arbitral tribunals should also apply the parties'
agreement but in such a case, the arbitrators would have the power to
override the agreement, with less risk of the award being
unenforceable under Article V, section 1, part D of the New York
Convention,8 as there would not be an infringement of the
procedure agreed by the parties. In this regard, one scholar stated:
79. Bhushan, supra note 24, at 601.
80. Makarius, supra note 2, at 59-60 (As one author states, "if regarded as procedural
law, application of the burden and standard of proof may in certain circumstances be subject
to challenges in set-aside proceedings or invoked as grounds for refusing the recognition
and enforcement of arbitral awards pursuant to article V(1)(d) of the New York Convention.
Under this provision the enforcement of an arbitral award may be refused where the arbitral
procedure was not in accordance with the agreement of the parties, or, failing such
agreement, in accordance with the law of the country where the arbitration took place.").
81. Indeed, if this is the case, the award should be recognized and enforced unless its
enforcement violates public policy, which has been interpreted restrictively in several
jurisdictions.
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The determination of whether a matter is substantive or
procedural would also be relevant [. ... ] in view of the
provisions in national laws concerning the setting aside of
arbitral awards and of the provisions of international
conventions concerning the recognition of such decisions
and their control. First, these conventions only provide for
the recognition and enforcement of awards. Secondly,
while the erroneous application of substantive law is
generally not a ground for refusing enforcement under the
New York Convention (unless the award and its
enforcement would violate (international) public policy),
recognition and enforcement can be refused under Article
V(1)(D) of the Convention if: the arbitral procedure was
not in accordance with the agreement of the parties or,
failing such agreement, was not in accordance with the
law of the country where the arbitration took place.82
In the end, whether the burden of proof is a substantive or a
procedural norm does not only limit the parties' authority to modify
the rules, but it actually influences the arbitral tribunal's approach to
those types of agreements. In other words, the likelihood of
upholding the burden of proof rules agreed upon by the parties is
higher when those rules are considered to be procedural law in
nature, rather than substantive law. This is because of the chances
that the award might be unenforceable.
3. Burden of ProofRules as Intertwined with Substantive
and Procedural law
Different views have been expressed as to whether the burden of
proof is a procedural or a substantive issue. Unsettled doctrine
discussions and silent legal instruments lead to a lack of clarity on the
question of whether the burden of proof is a substantive or procedural
issue in international commercial arbitration.83 Generally, civil law
systems are more inclined to consider it a substantive matter, while
82. Andreas Reiner, Burden and General Standards ofProof ARB. INT'L 331 (1992).
83. Makarius, supra note 2, at 56.
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common law jurisdictions usually consider burden of proof procedural
in nature.84 Evidence has traditionally been considered as a procedural
issue. However, the burden of proof needs to be analyzed, keeping in
mind that it is inherently intertwined with the substantive law in a way
that affects the outcome of the case; just as every other substantive
law.8 5
There are different reasons for suggesting that the law applicable
to the substance of the dispute should also be the one that governs
the burden of proof. First, this approach is consistent with the broad
autonomy that the parties have to determine the rules that will govern
the dispute adjudication process. Also, the enforceability of the
award would be better assured since an incorrect application of
substantive law is usually not enough to set aside an award.8 6
Moreover, the burden of proof rules determine how easy or difficult
it may be to enforce a claim, which is highly related to the merits of
the case (i.e., presumptions), unlike the procedural issues. Another
advantage to considering the burden of proof as part of substantive
law rules is that this would give more foreseeability to the parties,
even prior to the commencement of the arbitration because they will
frequently have agreed on a choice of substantive law. On the
contrary, procedural rules are commonly chosen only at the beginning
of the arbitration.8 7
All in all, it is important to consider the burden of proof rules in
their entire complexity as they have consequences both in procedural
and substantive issues.88 The better view, indeed, seems to take the
approach of having specialized rules regarding the issues of burden
and standard of proof in international arbitration, superseding the
discussion of procedural versus substantive law.89
84. Schlaepfer, supra note 21, at 127.
85. Bhushan, supra note 24, at 608.
86. Reiner, supra note 82, at 332.
87. Reiner, supra note 82, at 331 (In addition regarding this matter, the same author
states that a decision concerning the burden of proof rules should be taken by the full
arbitral tribunal, irrespective of whether procedural decisions can be taken by the chairman
alone).
88. Etienne Verges, El derecho francis de la prueba civil, ACTUALIDAD JURIDICA
UNIVERSIDAD DEL DESARROLLO 81 (2013).
89. GARY B. BORN, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 2314 (Kluwer L. Int'l
2nd ed. 2014).
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Complementing this approach, other authors have suggested that
prior to the commencement of the arbitration the parties should
carefully draft the arbitration clause, taking advantage of the silence of
institutional rules for adopting clear rules on burden and standard of
proof. During the arbitration, the arbitral tribunal should encourage the
parties to reach an agreement or, in the absence of an agreement,
inform the parties about their expectations.90 Such a position would
not only help the arbitrators in deciding the dispute, but would reduce
the possibility of the award being unenforceable under the New York
Convention.91
To summarize, despite the position one may take when defining
the burden of proof as a procedural or a substantive matter, what
cannot be denied is that the answer adopted will undoubtedly affect
the capability of the parties to shift the burden in different ways.
F. External Interpretation of an Agreement Regarding
the Burden of Proof
Usually the parties recognize the terms and consequences of
what they have agreed upon. Generally, provided that those
conditions are self-sufficient, the arbitrators will only need to apply
them to regulate the procedural relationship of the parties. However,
sometimes an agreement modifying the burden of proof rules may be
unclear or rendered impossible to apply in its strict literality. In such
a case, the arbitral tribunal is in charge of providing an external
interpretation that enables the parties to identify their duties and risks
within the context of the arbitration proceeding.
In this regard, an author has mentioned that there are "situations
in which this assumption [self-sufficiency of the parties agreement to
regulate their relationship] may prove false: for example, if a
difference arises between the parties, and they disagree on what the
legal framework is (notwithstanding that they may have agreed in the
past, prior to the conflict); if third parties' interests or public interests
are affected, and mandatory rules or policies override the parties'
agreement; or if the agreed terms or legal framework may be
90. Bhushan, supra note 24, at 610.
91. Id. at 611.
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interpreted in more than one way or need specification by
external sources."92
Regardless of whether the agreement modifying the burden of
proof rules is ambiguous or not, the arbitral tribunal should always
interpret what the parties agreed to in light of the principles of equal
treatment and due process, keeping in mind any risk of
unenforceability. Such interpretation, however, will constitute a limit
to the parties' freedom to modify the burden of proof rules when the
agreement is unclear or impossible to apply in a literal manner. In
other words, the parties' capability to modify the burden of proof is
limited by their own capacity to establish that new burden in clear
terms.
G. Final Considerations Regarding Limits of Party Autonomy
To determine when the principle of party autonomy should be
limited, some have given a great deal of importance to the different
theories that explain the juridical nature of international arbitration.
In this sense, whether it is considered of contractual, jurisdictional,
or hybrid nature, authors have assumed a different approach to the
scope of the parties' authority to govern the framework of
international arbitration. As some have explained:
The difficulty (and goal of this article) is in deciding just
when party autonomy should be trumped. To answer this
question we must know what weight party autonomy
deserves in each factual scenario. This will usually be
dictated by one's understanding of the nature of
arbitration. The more that contractualist arguments are
favoured, the greater the inclination will be to uphold
party autonomy, and vice versa.9 3
The fact that nowadays the hybrid and the autonomous theories
are the ones favored by the majority does not help to solve the
92. Giuditta Cordero-Moss, Limits to Party Autonomy in International Commercial
Arbitration, OSLO L. REv. 47, 48 (2014).
93. Barraclough, supra note 34, at 217.
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problem. Indeed, the hybrid-nature theory only suggests that party
autonomy might have some limitations, but does not clarify where
those limitations are established or the precise weight of parties'
authority in the context of international arbitration. The same can be
sustained with respect to those who consider arbitration as having its
own and autonomous juridical nature.
Notwithstanding the aforementioned, we consider the nature of
international commercial arbitration to favor the parties' autonomy to
modify the burden of proof, rather than limit that ability. Therefore,
it is improper to consider it a restriction to the parties' autonomy.
V. The Powers of the Arbitral Tribunal to Modify the
Burden of Proof Rules
With the objective of examining the powers of the arbitral
tribunal to modify the burden of proof rules, we will first explain the
existing discussion regarding the role of the tribunal in the arbitral
proceeding. Second, we will analyze whether arbitrators have any
power to allocate the burden of proof and discuss later whether they
are entitled to modify a previous agreement made by the parties
altering the burden of proof norms. Finally, we will evaluate whether
the arbitral tribunal could change the rules on the burden of proof
established by domestic laws when the parties have not previously
modified them.
A. Role ofArbitrators in the Arbitral Proceeding
While the parties of an international commercial arbitration are
responsible for demonstrating the facts that support their claims or
defenses, arbitral tribunals are expected to evaluate such evidence in
light of the burden and standard of proof rules applicable to the
proceeding.94 However, the distribution of responsibilities between
the arbitral tribunal and the parties is generally not regulated in the
national laws of international commercial arbitration.95
94. Bhushan, supra note 24, at 601.
95. Claude Reymond, The Practical Distinction Between the Burden of Proof and the
Taking ofEvidence - An English Perspective,10 ARB. INT'L. 324 (1994).
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Some scholars have noted that the inquisitive character of the
procedure suggests hat the tribunal should act in a proactive way,
giving the arbitrators the duty of explaining to the parties what is
expected from them.96 They argue that the arbitral tribunal should
make sure that the parties understand the standard of proof applicable
to the case and "identify the party that has to satisfy that burden."97
As stated by one author:
On balance, I tend to think that the arbitrator has the duty
and the authority to indicate to the parties that if they
want to prove or to disprove a fact or set of facts that is
central in the arbitration, they have to adduce the
evidence that he considers as appropriate [. . .]. It is
always awkward for an arbitrator to dismiss a claim on
the basis of failure of a party to bring evidence which it
had the burden of providing unless there was a clear
indication to that effect beforehand.98
In a similar way, Gary Born explains that in the absence of
voluntary evidence-taking, the way of evidence-taking and evidence-
presentation in international arbitration would be subject to the
parties' arbitration agreement, the applicable institutional rules and
national laws, and finally the discretion of the arbitrators as well.
Even though the aforementioned usually produces a complex
interplay of rules, as a practical matter "it will often mean that the
arbitral tribunal will have fairly substantial discretion to define the
manner of evidence-taking."99
On the other side, some authors have argued that arbitral
tribunals shall observe a more passive role, and that only under
exceptional circumstances should the arbitrators order the production
of evidence despite negligence or inactivity of the interested party.
Among the arguments given in this sense, it has been sustained that
the other party - the one not interested in the production of new
96. Schlaepfer, supra note 21, at 130.
97. Rodriguez, supra note 11.
98. Reymond, supra note 95, at 325.
99. Born, supra note 3, at 769.
2016] 71
Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.
evidence - shall have designed its litigation strategy considering only
the evidence already submitted by its rival.oo
Currently, there is a growing tendency in international
arbitration where arbitral tribunals remain passive, due to several
reasons. First, arbitrators are afraid of procedural complaints.
Second, the common law tradition, where the judge plays a passive
role, has influenced the way in which arbitrations have been
conducted. Third, the fact that in some cases the arbitrators are
appointed by a party makes them act more carefully. Finally,
arbitrators might prefer this approach because it makes their jobs
easier, as an active role requires "a much better command of the facts
of the case."o
In our opinion, arbitral tribunals generally should not assist the
parties by requesting additional evidence to demonstrate a fact
because such position might undermine the arbitrators' impartiality
by favoring one party over the other.'0 2 We acknowledge situations
may occur where the arbitrators would need to take a more active
role, for example, if it is sufficiently justified under an "international
due process" standard. Notwithstanding agreement or not with our
position, in close call decisions and especially if the tribunal has a
passive role, it is extremely important to determine who has the
burden of proof and the applicable standard. Only in this manner will
the arbitral tribunal have a juridical basis for deciding the dispute.
Regarding the ways of facing the aforementioned problem, some
scholars have explained that arbitral awards that deal with questions
of burden of proof generally apply the law governing the merits of
the dispute. Others seem to apply an international or "autonomous
approach by adopting their own rules without reference to national
law [. . .] often limit[ing] themselves to general statements or rules
such as actori incumbit probatio. Obviously such general and rather
abstract principles can hardly be in conflict with any national law
and rightly have been considered to constitute universal rules."10 3
100. Aleman, supra note 49, at 51.
101. Jurgen Mark et al., Germany Section ofBaker & McKenzie, INT'L ARB. Y.B. 197-98
(2011-2012).
102. Schlaepfer, supra note 21, at 130.
103. Reiner, supra note 82, at 333.
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B. Broad Powers of the Arbitral Tribunal to Allocate
the Burden of Proof
Under the international commercial arbitration practice, the
arbitral tribunal has the authority to determine which side has the
burden of proving any given fact, regardless of what the applicable
law actually provides. The great discretion of the arbitral tribunal to
determine the burden of proof applicable in an international
arbitration proceeding is confirmed, for example, by Article 19,
section 2 of the UNCITRAL Model Law. The provision is phrased in
the broadest possible terms and states that the authority of the arbitral
tribunal "includes the power to determine the admissibility,
relevance, materiality and weight of any evidence." Its purpose is to
ensure that in making rulings on the evidence, arbitrators enjoy the
greatest possible autonomy and are therefore free from having to
observe the strict legal rules of evidence. A similar provision is
contained in Article 27.4 of the UNCITRAL Rules, Article 9 of the
IBA Rules on the Taking of Evidence, and Article 22.2 of the
HKIAC Arbitration Rules.
Additionally, Article 25 of the ICC Rules enables the arbitrators
to establish the facts of the case "in the shortest time possible [. . ]
by all appropriate means." Similarly, Article 16 of the Singapore
International Arbitration Centre allows the arbitrators to conduct the
proceeding in any manner they consider appropriate after consulting
with the parties. Article 14.2 of the LCIA Rules also empowers the
arbitral tribunal with the "widest discretion" to conduct the
proceedings, subject to fairness and national legislation.10 4
As it can be noted, most international arbitration rules do
empower the arbitral tribunal with discretion to alter the applicable
procedure in accordance with the requirements of the case, enabling
the parties to present their claims in a reliable, equitable and efficient
manner.05 The jurisdictional powers of the arbitral tribunal to
determine or shift the burden of proof can also be noted in the
following comment on an ICC award:
104. Bhushan, supra note 24, at 602.
105. Id.
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The arbitral tribunal in this case applied the somewhat
obvious rule that the market price of oil constituted an
objective criterion for determining the existence or non-
existence of a loss at a given day and that the other party
had to prove the contrary in order to rebut this
presumption.106
It is clear that the arbitral tribunal here applied a presumption
based on common sense and asked the other party to prove the
contrary. The same author also comments on ICC award 2216 to
reinforce the point:
In that case the arbitral tribunal rightly presumed that the
buyer's refusal to accept delivery of the contractually
agreed quantity of oil and to pay the corresponding price
because prices had gone down caused loss to the seller.
The arbitral tribunal further stated that this presumption
could only be reversed by the buyer if he proved that the
oil was in fact resold to a third party at a price above the
market price.10 7
These two common sense examples confirm the idea that the
arbitrators have a broad and discretionary power to determine which
side has the burden of proving a particular fact or set of facts that
will highly influence the outcome of the decision.
On another issue, the powers of the arbitral tribunal can also be
noted when the arbitration deals with the issue of unavailable
evidence. In another ICC case, the arbitral tribunal shifted the burden
of proof, disregarding what the applicable law provided. In that case,
the tribunal decided the following:
106. Reiner, supra note 82, at 333.
107. Id.
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The destruction of the samples by X (the owners'
consultant) has prevented a possible clarification as to
whether or not the samples submitted by the contractor
did correspond in an adequate manner to the original
sample approved on August 28, 1985. The responsibility
for the destruction of the sample lies with the owner and
a fair evaluation of this situation leads to the conclusion
that the contractor is to be put in the same position as if it
had brought the required proof. In view of the foregoing
the claims of the owner with regard to the submission of
unsuitable samples must be rejected. It has to be assumed
that one or several of the samples presented could have
been approved.10s
Moreover, it has been explained that as a practical manner,
"most arbitrators will conclude that .'[w]hen a party . . . has access
to relevant evidence, the Tribunal is authorized to draw adverse
inferences from the failure of that party to produce such evidence."'
109
This shows that in practice, arbitral tribunals have broad powers
to determine which party has the burden of proof, or to shift that
burden by applying abstract principles that are generally accepted in
all jurisdictions with absolute independence from what the applicable
national law provides. Notwithstanding the aforementioned, the
question remains whether the arbitrators are obliged to respect a
previous agreement of the parties which shifts the burden of proof
rules.
C Are Arbitrators Obliged to Respect the Parties' Agreement?
Generally, arbitral tribunals do not have the power to change the
burden of proof rules determined by the parties. Indeed, if the arbitral
tribunal disregards the express agreement made by the parties, that
might be a reason to render the award unenforceable under Article V,
section 1, part d of the New York Convention, which provides that
recognition and enforcement of an award may be refused when "the
108. Id. at 335.
109. Born, supra note 89, at 2315.
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arbitral procedure was not in accordance with the agreement of the
parties, or, failing such agreement, was not in accordance with the law
of the country where the arbitration took place." The risk of
unenforceability is not a meaningless issue because the arbitral
tribunal's "duty to render an enforceable award is referred to in
arbitral awards, national laws, institutional rules, ethical codes and
scholarly writing."'1"
However, the alleged lack of arbitral power to override the
parties' agreement is still subject to certain public policy
considerations. When the arbitrators are faced with the question of
applying the agreements made by the parties regarding the allocation
or scope of the burden of proof, such decision should always consider
the arbitral tribunal's obligations. Specifically, it is important to
balance the parties' agreement with the arbitrators' own responsibility
to adopt fair and equitable procedures suitable to the circumstances of
the arbitration, avoiding the risks of unenforceability, unnecessary
delays or exaggerated costs.'" For example, an arbitral tribunal might
decide to refuse to apply an agreement that modifies the burden and
standard of proof rules in a way that is inconsistent with the
mandatory applicable laws or prevents one of the parties to adequately
present its case. 112 Indeed, the arbitral tribunal has the duty of deciding
the dispute based on a procedural framework that enables both sides to
present their case with a real possibility to obtain a favorable
judgment.
D. Arbitrators' Authority to Modify Domestic Rules
One of the central issues of international commercial arbitration
is the emphasis on the procedural discretion vested upon the
arbitrators. This is confirmed by Article 19, section 2 of the
UNCITRAL Model Law and several institutional arbitration rules
that provide for a wide discretionary power of the arbitral tribunal to
conduct the arbitration proceeding, including Article 27.4 of the
UNCITRAL Rules, Article 25 of the ICC Rules, Article 9 of the IBA
110. Barraclough, supra note 34, at 215.
111. Michael Pryles, Limits to Party Autonomy in Arbitral Procedure, 24 J. INT'L ARB.
327, 337 (2007).
112. Id. at 338.
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Rules on the Taking of Evidence, and Article 14.2 of the LCIA
Rules, among others.113
The ability of arbitral tribunals to change the rules on the burden
of proof established by domestic laws (when they are not modified
by the parties), shall depend on the character of the said norms.
Indeed, it will depend on whether the norm is mandatory or
dispositive under the applicable domestic law, as well as if they are
characterized as substantive or procedural.
It has been sustained that if the burden of proof is considered a
matter of procedural law, the arbitral tribunal is empowered to set the
burden that considers appropriate. On the other hand, if the burden of
proof rules are deemed substantive law, then the arbitrators are
usually not going to be empowered to shift those burdens established
by domestic laws. An author explains the aforementioned in the
following terms:
Although the debate on the character of the burden and
standard of proof in international arbitration may seem, in
light of the foregoing, rather outdated, it is not. For that
character may still have a bearing on the question of what
burden and standard of proof are to be applied. If regarded
as procedural law, failing's the parties' agreement, the
tribunal would be empowered to set both the standard and
burden of proof its own, subject to limitations, if any, by
the procedural law of the arbitration. By contrast, the
tribunal would lack such powers, should the burden and
standard of proof be considered substantive law issues. In
such circumstances, it would have to apply the burden and
standard of proof as enshrined in the applicable
substantive law.1 14
The allocation of the burden of proof will also surely present a
choice of law inquiry. The tribunal will decide either to apply the law
of the arbitral seat or the law governing the substantive issues.
Ultimately, there is no clear answer. Some authors are of the view that
113. Bhushan, supra note 24, at 602.
114. Makarius, supra note 2, at 59.
772016]
Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.
the burden of proof is intertwined with the substantive legal rules,
while others consider some burden of proof rules the result of purely
procedural matters."' This paper has suggested that the burden of
proof rules are highly intertwined with substantive issues and therefore
could be considered of the same juridical nature if there are no specific
rules to supersede that discussion. It is important, however, that the
arbitral tribunal allocates the burden of proof in light of the assessment
of the applicable substantive law and procedures adopted in the
arbitration."6 In doing so, the arbitral tribunal is not tied by the laws
of a given state. In fact, arbitrators do not need to apply the national
laws of a specific jurisdiction, but are empowered to create
specialized rules in light of "the particular substantive issues and
procedures."17
VI. Conclusion
Generally, the parties of an international commercial arbitration
have the power to change the burden of proof rules. This statement is
supported by the principle of party autonomy, the juridical nature of
arbitration, and the goals pursued by said institution. Indeed, the
principle of party autonomy enables the parties of an arbitration
proceeding to choose the procedural framework they wish to apply to
the process of resolving the dispute, the governing law of the
contract, the place where any potential dispute should be resolved,
and of course, the burden of proof rules to which they would be
subject. In turn, whatever theory regarding the juridical nature of
international commercial arbitration one adheres to, it is undeniable
that the agreement of the parties plays a central role in any
procedure. Finally, the efficiency and flexibility that the principle of
party autonomy provides to the system is considered as one of the
main advantages of arbitration as a method of dispute resolution.
The parties' ability to modify the burden of proof rules in the way
they consider appropriate is not an absolute right. That freedom is
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limited by the principle requiring that both sides must be treated fairly
and equally, the mandatory rules applicable to the arbitration,
considerations of public policy and good faith, and external
interpretation issues. The parties' agreement cannot go against public
policy of a country because the award could be unenforceable on the
grounds of Article V, section 2, part b of the New York Convention.
Also, any agreement regarding the burden of proof by the parties must
be made in good faith and in clear terms. If the parties structure the
burden of proof rules making it impossible or unreasonably
burdensome for one of them to adequately present their case with a
real chance to obtain a favorable award, such an agreement is deemed
to be inapplicable, null or void. The arbitral tribunal should not apply
an unfair agreement because this might be basis for refusing the
recognition and enforcement of the final award under the New York
Convention.
The parties' authority to modify the burden of proof rules is also
limited by the mandatory rules applicable to a particular procedure,
that is to say, those that apply irrespective of their choices. Therefore,
notwithstanding the fact that distinguishing between a mandatory and
a dispositive norm is not an easy task, classifying the burden of proof
rules within one of those categories would affect the parties' authority
of altering it.
Classifying the burden of proof as either procedural or
substantive matter affects the likelihood of the agreement modifying
the burden being upheld by the arbitral tribunal. Indeed, if the
burden of proof is a matter of procedural law, it is less likely that the
arbitral tribunal would change the agreement adopted by the parties
because the award could be unenforceable under Article V, section 1,
part d of the New York Convention, which mandates respect for the
procedure selected by the parties. If, however, the burden is
considered a substantive norm, the arbitral tribunal should also apply
the parties' agreement and the arbitrators would have the power of
overriding the agreement, but with less risk of the award being set
aside under the commented norm.
The main reason to argue that the law applicable to the
substance of the dispute should govern the burden of proof is
because it guarantees the principle of party autonomy and protects
the enforceability of the award. However, the general theory suggests
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that the burden of proof rules are intertwined both with procedural
and substantive issues. This is why we hold the view that specialized
rules regarding the burden and standard of proof in international
commercial arbitration should be adopted to supersede the referred
discussion. Such a position not only helps the arbitrators in deciding
the dispute, but also reduces the possibilities of the award being
rendered unenforceable under the New York Convention.
There is a discussion regarding the role - whether active or
passive - that arbitrators should play in a particular proceeding. In
international commercial arbitration practice, if there is no agreement
previously made by the parties, the arbitrators are deemed to hold
broad powers to determine which side has the burden of proof,
regardless of what the applicable law actually provides. Such great
discretion to determine the allocation and scope of the burden of
proof in an international arbitration proceeding is confirmed both by
case law and the different international arbitration institutional rules.
However, it is understood that arbitral tribunals should follow
the burden of proof rules agreed upon by the parties because
arbitrators generally do not have the power to override those
agreements. As explained, however, the arbitral tribunal should not
blindly apply whatever procedural framework the parties might have
agreed upon. Arbitrators should be cautious about applying a fair
procedure, as the opposite might be used as a basis for challenging
the award. Therefore, when the arbitral tribunal is faced with the
issue of analyzing the agreements made by the parties regarding the
allocation or scope of the burden of proof, its application should
always consider the arbitral tribunal's obligation to adopt procedures
suitable to the arbitration, avoiding the risks of unenforceability,
unnecessary delays, or exaggerated costs.
In the end, recognizing party autonomy while preserving the
fundamental protections coming from domestic laws (mandatory
rules) and international practice (fair and equal treatment, good faith,
and others) is of the essence. Only in this manner can international
commercial arbitration be accepted as an effective dispute resolution
mechanism.
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